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FEDNAV, LTD. V. CHESTER: BALLAST WATER 
AND THE BATTLE TO BALANCE STATE AND 
FEDERAL REGULATORY INTERESTS 
Jason G. Howe* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester,1 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal of a constitutional challenge to the 
Michigan Ballast Water Statute (MBWS).2  By unanimously affirming 
the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan,3 the Fednav Court not only declined to invalidate state laws 
protecting Michigan’s waters from aquatic nuisance species (ANS),4 but 
also rejected claims that the MBWS should be preempted by broad 
federal regulation.5   
Through its Fednav decision, the Sixth Circuit iterated that Michigan 
may still play a vital role in protecting its ecological and economic 
interests.  ANS pose a serious threat to the ecological well-being of 
Michigan’s waters and the state’s economic health.6  Accordingly, ANS 
                                            
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law.  I would like to thank 
both Professor David Owen, whose insight and guidance proved invaluable, and my wife, 
Amanda, for her patience and support.  Any errors herein are entirely my own.  
 1. 547 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 2. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 324.3112 (LexisNexis 2009).  
 3. Fednav, Ltd., v. Chester, 505 F. Supp. 2d 381 (E.D. Mich. 2007), aff’d, 547 F.3d 
607 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 4. 16 U.S.C. § 4702(1) (1994) (defining ANS as “nonindigenous species that 
threaten[] the diversity or abundance of native species or the ecological stability of 
infested waters.”).  See Jason A. Boothe, Comment, Defending the Homeland: A Call to 
Action in the War Against Aquatic Invasive Species, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 407, n.1 (2008). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . to regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.”) (emphasis added). 
 6. See Fednav, 547 F.3d at 610; Boothe, supra note 4, at 410-11; Loren Remsberg, 
Too Many Cooks in the Galley: Overlapping Agency Jurisdiction of Ballast Water 
Regulation, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1412, 1414-15 (2008).  Introduction of ANS results 
“in severe and irreversible impacts on environmental quality and biological diversity, on 
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control measures must be comprehensive, particularly in the Great Lakes 
region, since incomplete measures are unlikely to provide adequate 
protection.7  While federal laws clearly preempt those of a state when 
conflicts arise,8 states may nonetheless contribute to achieving the 
common goal of protecting the state’s environmental and economic 
interests.  Furthermore, states are obligated by a duty to their citizens’ 
health and economic security to enact state-centric legislation when 
Congress leaves loopholes9 in its regulatory scheme.  As such, the 
pertinent legal question addressed in this Note is whether Fednav struck 
an appropriate balance between federal and state regulatory interests in 
allowing the MBWS to stand. 
This Note initially considers the federal attempts to regulate ANS in 
the Great Lakes along with the evolution of overlapping federal and state 
regulatory schemes for managing ANS.  After analyzing the Sixth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Fednav, this Note briefly explains that the Fednav 
Court appropriately recognized Congress’ intent to balance the 
supremacy of federal law with Michigan’s duty to implement legislation 
that protects its ecological and economic interests.  Finally, this Note 
considers Fednav in the broader context of federal-state cooperation on 
issues such as ballast water regulation and ANS.  It posits that the key 
issue is how to best manage overlapping state and federal control, then 
proposes a solution for implementing coterminous federal and state 
regulations.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Evolution of Environmental Regulation in a Nutshell 
A brief history of state and federal environmental regulations is 
necessary to put current ANS regulations into context.10  Modern 
                                                                                                  
economic and recreational activities, and on public health.”  Id. at 1414 (citations 
omitted).  Damage estimates for the Great Lakes region alone exceeded $5 billion in 
1995.  Id. at 1414-15. 
 7. See Boothe, supra note 4, at 414-26.  
 8. Ohio Mfrs. Ass’n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824, 825-28 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 9. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612. 
 10. Detailing the rich and invariably complex history of environmental regulation is 
well beyond the scope of this Note.  For more detailed treatment of the subject, consider 
the following: Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law (Uni. Chicago 
Press 2004); Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal 
Common Law of Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004) (tracing the history of 
trans-boundary environmental disputes in the United States during the late 19th and early 
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environmental laws began as something else entirely—nuisance claims.11  
These claims more or less dealt with local issues such as factory smoke 
or dust, on a city-by-city, state-by-state basis.12  However, as 
industrialization proliferated during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, so did problems with various environmental hazards, 
ultimately resulting in a push to centralize federal control of such 
ecological hazards.13  Inter-state industrial and commercial competition 
drove this change, as state-centric regulation could no longer manage 
increasing environmental hazards produced on a regional and national 
scale.14  By the latter half of the twentieth century, Congress had enacted 
broad laws intended to protect the nation’s ecology, along with the social 
and economic health tied thereto.15  Sweeping federal mandates such as 
the Clean Water Act of 1970 and the Clean Air Act of 1972 frequently 
displaced state-centric environmental regulations.16   
                                                                                                  
20th Centuries); Neil Gunningham, Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: 
Shifting Architectures, 21 J. ENV. L. 179 (2009) (examining the evolution of 
environmental law, regulation and governance from the early 1970s into the present); 
Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative Federalism: The 
Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to Combat Climate Change, 27 UCLA 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, 231 (2009) (arguing that states have progressively taken a greater 
role in environmental regulation over the past several decades).   
 11. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 
600 & n.90 (1996).  See also Aldred's Case, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B.) (reasoning 
that one should use his property in such a manner as not to injure that of another.); Tenant 
v. Goldwin, (1702) 92 Eng. Rep. 222, 224 (Q.B.) (expressing the maxim that “every man 
must so use his own as not to damnify another.”).   
 12. Esty, supra note 11, at 600 n.90.  See also Robert V. Percival, Environmental 
Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141,1156 
(1995) (suggesting that even federal environmental programs of the 1950s and 1960s 
were “premised on the notion” that environmental problems fell within the purview of 
state and local governments). 
 13. Esty, supra note 11, at 600 & n.93.  
 14. Id. at 601-2 (arguing Congress enacted broad federal laws because patchwork 
state laws led to interstate businesses shopping state-by-state for more lenient standards). 
 15. Id. at 602.  Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970, the Clean Water Act in 
1972, the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974, and the 1976 Resource Conservation Act, 
among others.  Id.  
 16. Id. at 602.  See also Percival, supra note 12, at 1155. 
384 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
B. Federal and State Attempts to Regulate Aquatic Nuisance Species 
In 1990, Congress recognized the zebra mussel17 as one of several 
new environmental hazards in the Great Lakes region, passing the 
Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act 
(NANPCA) in response.18  NANPCA recognized that ballast water19 
discharges caused the ANS hazard, and sought to control ballast water 
management systems20 by charging the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG) with developing and implementing such regulations.21  In 1993, 
the USCG issued regulations requiring ballast-carrying vessels entering 
the Great Lakes from beyond the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)22 to 
meet one of three ballast water management practices: (1) exchange 
ballast water beyond the EEZ; (2) retain ballast water; or (3) use an 
environmentally sound alternative.23  Ships were also encouraged to keep 
records of each ballast water exchange.24  While compliance was 
originally voluntary, it became mandatory two years later.25   
By 1996, Congress recognized that ANS posed a threat not only to 
the Great Lakes, but to the entire country and amended NANPCA with 
the National Invasive Species Act (NISA).26  NISA retained the ballast 
water regulations of NANPCA, and required that ballast-carrying vessels 
entering inland U.S. waters file a ballast water management plan with the 
USCG twenty-four hours prior to entering port.27  Furthermore, NISA 
                                            
 17. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 610.  The zebra mussel, a bi-valve mollusk native to the 
Black and Caspian Seas, quickly coated water pipes, boat hulls, and consumed large 
quantities of microscopic organisms that local species relied on to survive.  Id.  
 18. See 16 U.S.C. § 4701 et seq. (2006). 
 19. Sea-going vessels often use water as ballast to add stability while at sea.  Fednav, 
505 F. Supp. 2d at 384.  Once in port, a vessel may discharge tens-of-millions of tons of 
water.  Remsberg, supra note 6, at 1413-14.  
 20. 16 U.S.C. § 4701(b)(1) (2006). 
 21. Id. at § 4711(b)(1) (2006). 
 22. 33 C.F.R. § 151.1504 (2008) (defining the EEZ as “the area . . . which extends 
from the base line of the territorial sea of the United States seaward 200 [nautical] 
miles.”). 
 23. Id. at § 151.1510(a) (2008).  
 24. Boothe, supra note 4, at 415-16. 
 25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4711(a)-(b).  Failure to comply is punishable by a fine of up to 
$27,500 and a “felony conviction for knowing violations.”  See also Boothe, supra note 
4, at 415-16. 
 26. Boothe, supra note 4, at 416-18.  See also Fednav, 547 F.3d at 611-12 (detailing 
control measures under NISA); 16 U.S.C. 4701(a)(13) (explaining that national action is 
required immediately). 
 27. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612.  See also 33 C.F.R. § 151.2041(b) (2008); Remsberg, 
supra note 6, at 1418-19. 
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specifically recognized that “participation and cooperation of the Federal 
Government and state governments” would eventually be necessary.28  
Atop NISA, Congress amended the Clean Water Act (CWA) to require 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate “vessels and 
other floating craft,” along with the discharge of “biological materials” 
such as ANS.29  However, the EPA refused to regulate ballast water 
discharges until it was ordered to do so in 2006 by the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California.30  The California 
court gave the EPA until September 30, 2008 to enact ballast water 
regulations that would coexist with NISA.31  The ramifications of this 
decision for Fednav are discussed in greater detail below.32 
However, the CWA, NANPCA, and NISA have each failed to fully 
regulate vessels with the potential to spread ANS via ballast water, 
leaving open an “enormous loophole”33 in the federal regulatory scheme.  
No federal ballast water regulation controlled vessels designated as “No 
Ballast On Board” (NOBOB).34  Vessels designated NOBOB have 
ballast tanks and can still carry ballast water.35  However, NOBOBs are 
usually already loaded with cargo, and therefore neither need, nor carry 
ballast when they enter the Great Lakes region.36  Although considered 
empty, a NOBOB vessel’s ballast tanks retain residual sediment and 
water that may house ANS.37  Once in port and unloaded, NOBOB 
vessels are free to take in water or adjust ballast levels as operators see 
                                            
 28. 16 U.S.C. § 4701(a)(15) (2006).  
 29. Remsberg, supra note 6, at 1415 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006)). 
 30. Remsberg, supra note 6, at 1418-19. 
 31. As of the publication of this Note, the EPA has enacted no such plan.  Remsberg, 
supra note 6, at 1418-19.  As a point of context, in 2005, Judge Illston of the Northern 
District of California found that the EPA's failure to regulate ballast water as a pollutant 
under the Clean Water Act was contrary to the clear intent of that statute, despite the fact 
that the EPA had exempted ballast water from regulation since 1973.  Nw. Envtl. 
Advocates v. EPA, 2005 WL 756614, at *8-9 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 30, 2005), aff’d, 537 F.3d 
1006 (9th Cir. 2008). She granted the EPA two years to promulgate regulations regarding 
the discharge of ballast water pursuant to the Clean Water Act. Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. 
EPA, 2006 WL 2669042, at *1 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 18, 2006).  The EPA has begun the 
process of soliciting comments for rulemaking, but has not yet enacted final rules. See 
Development of Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
Permits for Discharges Incidental to the Normal Operation of Vessels, 72 Fed. Reg. 
34241, 34241 (June 21, 2007). 
 32. See infra, Section III.  
 33. Fednav, 547 F.3d 612; Boothe, supra note 4, at 419.  
 34. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612; 33 C.F.R. § 151.1502 (2008). 
 35. Boothe, supra note 4, at 419 nn.92-93.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.; Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612. 
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fit, potentially introducing ANS in the very manner NISA sought to 
avoid.38  This is significant because eighty-five percent of all vessels 
entering the Great Lakes are designated NOBOB.39  In essence, these 
NOBOB vessels are “unregulated with respect to their ballast-water 
practices.”40 
C. Michigan’s Implementation of the Michigan Ballast Water Statute 
Recognizing this deficiency in the existing federal regulations, 
Michigan amended its Natural Resources and Environmental Protection 
Act to include the MBWS,41 under which all vessels “engaging in port 
operations in Michigan” as of January 1, 2007 had to obtain a state 
permit.42  The permit required a vessel’s operator to fill out a multi-page 
application43 and agree to follow state ANS regulations.44  Compliance 
required filing a report with the Michigan Department of Environmental 
Quality (MDEQ) prior to entering a Michigan port.45  A vessel not 
planning to exchange ballast water in Michigan had to certify such a 
decision with the MDEQ.46  Alternatively, vessels that planned to 
exchange ballast water had to employ one of four state ballast water 
treatment methods.47  Fednav arose in response to the MBWS, placing 
the security of both Michigan’s MBWS, and the security of the local 
health and economy in jeopardy. 
                                            
 38. Boothe, supra note 4, at 419 n.93; Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612. 
 39. Boothe, supra note 4, at 419. 
 40. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612.  
 41. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 324.3112 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 42. Id. § 324.3112(6). 
 43. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 613 (“[t]o obtain a General Permit, a vessel operator is 
required to fill out a three-page application and pay a $75 application fee and a $150 
annual fee.”). 
 44. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 324.3112(6) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 45. Id. (indicating that reports must include vessel name, port destination, date and 
type of last ballast-water management practice, total volume or weight of ballast on 
board, and a statement regarding whether the vessel intends to exchange any ballast water 
while in a Michigan port).  
 46. Id.  
 47. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 613.  Treatment options under the MBWS include (1) 
hypochlorite treatment, (2) chlorine dioxide treatment, (3) ultraviolet light radiation 
treatment, or (4) deoxygenation treatment.  Id.  
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III. THE FEDNAV, LTD. V. CHESTER DECISION 
In Fednav, a consortium of shipping companies and their 
associations, and port companies and their trade associations,48 sued 
MDEQ Director Steven Chester and other officials,49 seeking an 
injunction preventing enforcement of the MBWS on grounds that it 
violated the Michigan Constitution, the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses of the United States Constitution, and should be preempted by 
broad federal regulations.50  The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment 
shortly thereafter, while the defendants filed a corresponding motion to 
dismiss.51   
Assessing the case procedurally, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan should have considered whether the 
plaintiffs had standing to bring their case. However, the court never 
addressed standing. 52  Instead, the court first addressed the jurisdictional 
issues raised under the Eleventh Amendment,53 finding the plaintiffs 
lacked authorization to bring state-law claims against a Michigan official 
in federal court without state consent.54  The court then applied the 
“rational basis” test to the defendants’ due process claim,55 finding “[i]t 
was clearly rational for Michigan to enact [the MBWS],”56  then quickly 
dismissed the Commerce Clause claim for lack of “discriminatory affect” 
                                            
 48. Plaintiff-Appellants: Fednav, Ltd.; Canadian Forest Navigation Co., Ltd; Baffin 
Investments, Ltd.; Confornav, Ltd.; Shipping Federation of Canada; Seaway Great Lakes 
Trade Association; United States Great Lakes Shipping Association; Nicholson Terminal 
and Dock Co.; and, the American Great Lakes Ports Association. They are collectively 
referred to hereinafter as Plaintiffs.  See Fednav, 547 F.3d at 607. 
 49. Michigan Attorney General Michael Cox is also a Defendant-Respondent. Several 
environmental groups also intervened, including Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 
Alliance for the Great Lakes, National Wildlife Federation and Natural Resource Defense 
Council, Inc. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 384 n.2.  They are collectively referred to 
hereinafter as Defendants. 
 50. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 388-89. 
 51. Id. at 389-90. 
 52. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 391. 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding the 
Eleventh Amendment encompasses claims against a state by citizens of that state). 
 54. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 124-25 (1984) (indicating that the Supreme Court has “insisted . 
. . that the State's consent be unequivocally expressed.”)).  
 55. Id. at 391-92; see 37712, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. Liquor Control, 113 F.3d 614, 619-20 
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding substantive due process is only violated if a law fails to advance 
a legitimate interest).  
 56. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 391. 
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because the plaintiffs failed to state a claim of undue burden.57  In 
addressing plaintiffs’ primary claim that federal law must preempt the 
MBWS under United States v. Locke,58 the court tested for field 
preemption and conflict preemption.59  The trial court distinguished 
Locke from Fednav, holding that neither field preemption nor conflict 
preemption could apply when: (1) “NISA indisputably contemplates a 
role for states” to play,60 (2) there is no clear “interest in uniformity” at 
issue under NISA,61 unlike the state code at issue in Locke,62 and (3) the 
NISA savings clause exempts laws like the MBWS from preemption.63   
After oral arguments on all motions, the court dismissed each of 
plaintiffs’ claims.64  In dicta, the court indicated that if plaintiffs “want to 
make the policy argument that federal law should preempt all state 
regulation of ballast water management, they are free to do so before 
Congress.”65  
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first considered whether each plaintiff 
had standing to challenge the MBWS requirements that all vessels 
capable of carrying ballast water first obtain a permit and then employ a 
treatment system approved by the MDEQ.66  The court ultimately found 
that the shipping companies had standing to challenge the permit 
requirement because compliance required them to purchase a permit,67 
                                            
 57. Id. at 397-98. 
 58. 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding federal law preempted Washington state laws 
regulating aspects of the oil tanker industry because the state laws frustrated Congress’ 
intent to create a uniform regulatory scheme to control oil tanker design). 
 59. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 392-97.  Furthermore, “field preemption” occurs when 
“the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation,” while “conflict 
preemption” occurs when a provision of state law “actually conflicts with federal law.”  
Akron, 801 F.2d at 828 (internal quotations omitted). 
 60. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 395-96. 
 61. Id. at 395-96 (identifying this issue as key to both field preemption and conflict 
preemption considerations).  Unlike the flexible treatment regulations at issue in Fednav, 
in Locke, it was impossible to comply with incongruous vessel design regulations. Id. at 
396-97. 
 62. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 97 (identifying WASH. REV. CODE § 88.46.040(3) (1994) as 
the issue). 
 63. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 396. 
 64. Id. at 390-91. 
 65. Id. at 396.  
 66. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 614. 
 67. Id. at 615. 
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hence injury-in-fact.68  As a result, the court also conferred standing to 
the shipping associations, since their members had standing independent 
of the association.69  However, the court refused to confer standing to 
either the dock company or its association, as both failed to allege 
suffering injury-in-fact as a result of the permit requirement.70  
Additionally, the court found no plaintiff had standing to challenge the 
treatment requirement, because rather than allege that compliance would 
cost large sums of money, each plaintiff disavowed ever discharging 
ANS in their ballast water.71  As the court noted, rather than allege that 
the fee structure in place was too costly to shipping companies moving 
goods into Michigan ports, the plaintiffs argued only that their vessels 
did not release any ballast water.72  Had the plaintiffs argued that such 
treatment systems cost upwards of half-a-million dollars per vessel—as 
is the case—the court likely would have addressed the issue.73  However, 
as the Sixth Circuit noted, the plaintiffs’ “complaint is bereft of any 
allegation that any of the Plaintiffs has spent a single dollar, or otherwise 
been harmed, because of the treatment requirement.”74  As a result, the 
Sixth Circuit only addressed the treatment requirement.75  The plaintiffs’ 
failure to allege injury-in-fact under the MBWS treatment prong means 
that Michigan’s stricter ballast water treatment requirements, and others 
like it, remain open to challenge in the future.76  
While the Sixth Circuit agreed with the trial court that NISA 
specifically contemplated state and federal cooperation, the court found 
NISA’s savings clause related to ANS “control measures,” not 
“prevention.”77  Nonetheless, the court applied the intent test from Shaw 
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.78 in finding that Congress intended to allow states 
to employ preventative ANS measures in addition to “control 
measures.”79  In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to NISA and 
reasoned that Congress not only recognized the potential for a symbiotic 
                                            
 68. A “party bringing suit ‘must show that the action injures him in a concrete and 
personal way.’”  Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  
 69. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 615.  
 70. Id. at 616. 
 71. Id. at 616-17. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 616 (emphasis in original). 
 75. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 618. 
 76. Boothe, supra note 4, at 423. 
 77. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 619-20. 
 78. 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983) (stating that courts must “ascertain Congress’ intent.”). 
 79. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 620-21. 
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relationship between state and federal regulation,80 but encouraged it,81 
finding neither field preemption nor conflict preemption.82  Furthermore, 
the court found plaintiffs’ argument that shipping was inherently federal 
under Locke—and therefore beyond state control—to be misguided.83  
Instead, the court reasoned that Locke only required a court to consider 
the scope of a state’s regulation in relation to its federal counterpart, not 
the relative federal nature of the activity being regulated.84  Since it was 
“physically possible” to comply with both NISA and MBWA standards, 
and because additional reporting requirements under the MBWS do not 
infringe on NISA’s intent, the Sixth Circuit found no conflict 
whatsoever.85 
Having found that NISA contemplated state regulations like the 
MBWA, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause and due process claims.  Unlike the trial 
court, which applied the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.86 balancing test in 
finding the relative benefits of ANS regulation far outweighed the burden 
of completing “a few forms,”87 the Sixth Circuit found no balancing was 
necessary.88  The court reasoned that the Commerce Clause cannot act in 
dormancy when a federal regulation such as NISA specifically 
contemplates the enactment of state regulations like MBWS.89  
Emphatically, the court indicated that by “enacting NISA . . . Congress 
expressly contemplated, and indeed encouraged, state participation in 
ANS prevention measures.  We would lose our constitutional bearings if 
we were to hold that the Commerce Clause, in its dormancy, strikes 
                                            
 80. Id. at 620 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 4723 (recognizing the need for coordination with the 
states)).  
 81. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 620.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1401(15) (calling for the “participation 
and cooperation” of federal and state governments). 
 82. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 622-23.  See supra note 59. 
 83. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 622. 
 84. Id.  See also Locke, 529 U.S. at 108  
 85. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 623. 
 86. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (establishing the balancing test between commercial 
burden and putative state benefits). 
 87. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 624 (finding the permit requirement, an application fee of 
$75, and a “yearly fee” of $150 “de minimis”).  See also Ferndale Labs, Inc., v. 
Cavendish, 79 F.3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that an Ohio statute requiring all 
prescription drug wholesalers to fill out a two-page registration and pay a $100 fee did 
not violate the Commerce Clause, because, inter alia, “[w]e do not consider the $100 fee 
a burden.”).  
 88. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 624 (reasoning that “[i]ndeed, there is no need to conduct the 
Pike balancing at all.”) 
 89. Id. 
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down state regulation that Congress, in actively exercising its power 
under the Clause, expressly contemplated.”90    
Next, using reasoning parallel to that of the trial court, the Sixth 
Circuit found a rational basis91 for the MBWS, affirming the dismissal of 
plaintiff’s due process claim in just four paragraphs.92  Simply stated, 
“Michigan has a legitimate state interest in protecting its waters from 
further introductions of ANS from ballast-water discharges by 
oceangoing vessels.”93  Finally, in summing up its ruling, the court 
indicated it had “no basis to disrupt the . . . democratic process[].”94  The 
court’s final words are telling.   
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Fednav Correctly Seeks to Balance Federal and State Regulations 
The Fednav decision correctly indicates that federal courts will not 
find state environmental regulation unconstitutional when Congress 
provides avenues for state and federal regulatory cooperation.  Although 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of constitutional 
challenges to the MBWS without reaching the key issue of ballast water 
treatment, it nonetheless specifically recognized that Congress 
contemplated a regulatory future in which states may provide gap-fillers 
when federal regulations fail to sufficiently protect state interests.95  In 
effect, Fednav recognizes that federal and state authorities must 
cooperate.  
Fednav does not mark the first time courts have recognized that 
Congress intends states to have a broader, and perhaps more influential 
role in meeting federal regulatory ends.  For instance, in Massachusetts 
                                            
 90. Id. at 624 (emphasis in original). 
 91. See 37712, Inc., v. Ohio Dept. Liquor Control, 113 F.3d 614, 620 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(holding substantive due process is only violated if a law fails to advance a legitimate 
interest); Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a state law 
permit requirement “need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose” 
to be upheld); Doe v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503-04 (6th Cir. 
2007) (indicating that “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a 
rational basis” will suffice).  
 92. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 624-25. 
 93. Id. at 625. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 621 (“NISA’s test thus reveals that Congress expressly contemplated ANS 
prevention measures . . . that are conducted by the states.”); Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 
396 (“This indicates that a role for the states was forefront in the minds of the drafters of 
NISA.”). 
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v. EPA, the Supreme Court not only found that the EPA should control 
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act; it also granted 
Massachusetts the standing necessary to bring its case,96 thus affording 
Massachusetts a chance to dramatically influence federal policy.   
Similarly, the Supreme Court affirmed Georgia’s right to protect its 
citizens from environmental and chemical hazards originating outside the 
state.  As stated by Justice Holmes in Georgia v. Tennesee Copper Co., 
each state “has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped 
of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”97  The Supreme 
Court granted Georgia’s injunction, and upheld the state’s right to 
employ legal avenues when protecting its citizens.  Both cases stand as 
broad recognitions of a state’s right to protect their local environmental 
and economic interests when federal regulations fail to do so sufficiently.  
Without standing, neither of the states in either Mass. v. EPA, or Georgia 
v. Tennessee Copper Co. could have been heard, let alone defended their 
citizens from outside environmental threats.  In the broadest sense, all 
three—Mass. v. EPA; Georgia v. Tennesee Copper Co.; and, Fednav—
represent an understanding that states may play a vital role in protecting 
their local ecology and economy.   
B. Fednav and an Evolving Clean Water Act under Northwest 
Environmental Advocates v. U.S. 
The CWA provides another glimpse of congressional intent to allow 
states more control over local environmental measures, since “states can 
restrict water pollutants more stringently than the federal government 
pursuant the [CWA].”98  While the EPA had—until recently—refused to 
regulate ballast water under the CWA, the Ninth Circuit in Northwest 
Environmental Advocates v. U.S.99 affirmed a decision by the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California to invalidate 
40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a).100  Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a), the EPA stated its 
position that the CWA did not require it to regulate the release of ballast 
                                            
 96. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532. 
 97. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (holding Georgia had a right to protect its citizens from 
air pollution that originated outside its borders by granting state’s injunction and 
affirming state’s standing to bring suit). 
 98. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 394. 
 99. 537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 100. The invalidated section provided not only that vessel owners need not obtain a 
permit for “discharge incidental to the normal operation of a vessel, including the 
discharge of ballast water,” but that the EPA could not set such regulations.  Id. at 1010 
(emphasis added). 
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water.101  Northwest Environmental Advocates not only required the EPA 
to rework the invalidated regulation in a manner that recognizes the EPA 
is required to regulate ballast water under the CWA, but also in a manner 
that comports with Congress’ intended cooperation between both federal 
agencies and state powers.102  While Northwest Environmental Advocates 
does not directly entail federal preemption of state laws, the broad 
regulatory implications for managing ballast water will nonetheless 
impact preemption in the future, as an overbroad regulation under the 
CWA would undoubtedly displace many state-centric regulations similar 
to the MBWS.  Yet, as the Ninth Circuit indicated in Northwest 
Environmental Advocates, the savings clauses of NANPCA, NISA, EPA 
guidelines on cooperation, along with the CWA, all broadly 
“demonstrate a congressional intent to address the serious national 
problem of ballast water discharges of invasive species, and to do so on 
multiple, nonexclusive fronts.”103  Because the proposed replacement 
regulation has not yet been finalized, it remains unclear when the issue of 
conflict preemption will again become ripe.104  Nonetheless, the proposed 
permitting regulations are substantially similar to those already imposed 
by Michigan, and as is discussed in Section V of this Note, the EPA must 
act under the cooperation requirements of a council formed under 
President Clinton,105 and by its own internal mandates.106  For the time 
                                            
 101. Id. at 1027.  
 102. Id. at 1025 (mandating that the EPA include the Coast Guard, along with state and 
local agencies in any action). 
 103. Id. (emphasis added). 
 104. Proposed changes to the invalidated code section include a clear intent to regulate 
ballast water in the Great Lakes. However, the manner of that regulation, and whether the 
EPA plans to defer to the MBWS remains unclear.  The proposed regulation provides 
little detail.  See 73 Fed. Reg. 34296 (June 17, 2008). 
 105. See infra, Section IV. 
 106.  Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 
58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2159 (2009) (arguing that “congressional acts mandate enforcement 
by state regulatory agencies, establishing an institutional framework for agency-state 
cooperation.”).  See also Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (Aug. 4, 1999) 
(mandating that to “the extent practicable, State and local officials shall be consulted 
before any such action is implemented.”); EPA's Action Development Process, Guidance 
on Exec. Order No. 13132: Federalism (2008), available at 
http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/111908rb1.pdf at 21 (emphasizing the importance of 
agency consultation with state and local government officials given that “[state and local] 
governments carry out most of the day-to-day administration of many national 
environmental programs.”). 
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being, it is clear that states continue to play a substantial role in 
determining their regulatory future.107 
C. Employing Fednav’s Guidance to Better Manage Overlapping 
Federal and State Regulatory Schemes 
Fednav correctly recognizes that the intent of Congress is neither to 
vest total control of ANS and ballast water regulations in the federal 
government,108 nor for states to again seize sole control of such 
measures.109  Rather, a court weighing the constitutional challenge of a 
state regulation such as the MBWS must lean toward letting the 
regulation stand, particularly when the court can infer that Congress 
intended cooperation.  As the Sixth Circuit correctly noted in Fednav, 
“Congress also found that ‘resolving the problems associated with 
aquatic nuisance species will require the participation and cooperation of 
the Federal Government and State governments.’”110  Furthermore, the 
executive branch, by way of the USCG, indicated in 2004 that “the 
congressional mandate is clearly for a Federal-State cooperative regime 
in combating the introduction of [ANS] into U.S. waters from ship's [sic] 
ballast tanks. This makes it unlikely that preemption, which would 
necessitate consultation with the States under Executive Order 13132, 
will occur.”111  Titled “Federalism,” Executive Order 13132 mandated 
intensive consultation with states prior to imposing regulations that may 
trump those of a state.112  Furthermore, the USCG specifically stated that 
                                            
 107. See Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 781, 797 
(2008) (reasoning that the issue of “whether state law should be preempted is best 
characterized as a subjective ‘political’ decision that is most appropriately made by 
Congress, the most politically representative branch.”).  In NISA, Congress clearly 
indicated that federal and state agencies and political bodies should cooperate in 
regulating ANS.  
 108. As was the case during much of the mid- to late-twentieth century.  See Esty, 
supra note 11, at 601-02. 
 109. As was the case prior to the mid-twentieth century. Esty, supra note 11, at 600.  
See also Ophelia Eglene, Comment, Transboundary Air Pollution: Regulatory Schemes 
& Interstate Cooperation, 7 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 129, 133-34 (2002) (proposing 
the continuation of successful interstate regulatory control of air pollution under the 
Clean Air Act of 1970 after the federal government failed to provide sufficiently strict 
guidelines). 
 110. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 611 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 4701(15) (1996)). 
 111. Id. at 621 (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. 32864, 32868 (June 14, 2004)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 112. See Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (Aug. 4, 1999), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/fedreg /eo/eo13132.htm. 
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“each State is authorized under NISA to develop their own regulations if 
they feel that Federal regulations are not stringent enough.”113  
Nonetheless, Fednav can not be taken as definitive guidance on the issue 
of actually treating ballast water under the MBWS, as such direction will 
only come when a court hears the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim that the 
MBWS treatment requirement imposes undue burden on interstate 
commerce. 
1. Existing Theories for Managing Overlapping Federal and State 
Regulatory Schemes 
Before spinning Fednav’s guidance into a proposal for better 
managing overlapping federal and state regulatory schemes, it is 
important to understand—very briefly—existing suggestions for how 
best to achieve such an end.  Several proposals for managing overlapping 
regulatory issues deal more with the allocation of power—such as 
granting control to either a state, or the federal government, but seldom 
both at the same time.114  Fully addressing this and the myriad other 
existing theories is well beyond the scope of this Note.115  It is sufficient 
to say that outside of the ANS issue addressed in Fednav, examples of 
the federal-state power struggles abound, and that there exist 
innumerable proposed solutions for each such struggle.116   
A notable exception to the traditional concept of granting power to 
either federal or state agencies is a proposal for “modular environmental 
regulation,” which seeks to treat each environmental issues as a module 
to be addressed by several different agencies at both the state and federal 
                                            
 113. 69 Fed. Reg. 32864, 32865 (June 14, 2004). 
 114. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE 
L. J. 795, 807-08 (2005). 
 115. For a number of different conceptualizations of managing the overlap of state and 
federal regulation, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of 
Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555 (2002) (tracing the history of environmental 
regulation and a detailed consideration of different concepts for effecting that regulation); 
Dennis D Hirsch, Symposium Introduction: Second Generation Policy and the New 
Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2001) (detailing the history of traditional state and 
federal environmental regulation and proposing a move toward cooperation at all levels); 
Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from 
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998) (warning that the 
modern trend of reinventing traditional concepts of environmental regulation could be 
hazardous). 
 116. Freeman & Farber, supra note 114, at 807-08.  Currently, state and federal 
regulators are fighting over control of air and water pollution, endangered species 
protection, wetlands regulation, and water and energy supply.  Id.  
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levels.117  This approach assumes that agencies will not only cooperate 
effectively once the existing hierarchal structure is loosened, but that 
educating both the public and private sectors will make each party both 
amicable to such power sharing, and more likely to abide by decisions 
when they are made.118  While the Fednav-based proposal that follows 
may seem similar to “modular environmental regulation,” a notable 
difference is the use of an oversight committee, of sorts, to ensure 
cooperation between the many actors involved.  
2. Effecting a Better Solution 
Taking the next logical step, the question becomes whether there 
exists a means by which the tenets of federal-state cooperation identified 
by the Sixth Circuit in Fednav can be met. The blueprint for such a 
solution already exists in the National Invasive Species Council (NISC).  
In 1999, President Clinton established the NISC, which included the 
EPA, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security,119 
among others.120  Because no overarching law existed to control ANS, let 
alone ballast water regulations, the NISC was tasked with ensuring that 
each member agency followed its own guidelines for preventing the 
spread of ANS.121  In order to meet the NISC’s broad goal of preventing 
the spread of ANS, members were required to consult and cooperate with 
the states and with pertinent industry actors as the NISC compiled its 
biennial National Invasive Species Management Plan (NISMP).122  
Establishing the NISC marked the first attempt to bring ANS controls 
under one broad framework of intertwined federal and state regulations.  
An oversight body similar to the NISC could help harmonize ballast 
water regulations that have yet to be enacted by the EPA under the CWA 
with those already in place under NISA, the MBWS, and other similar 
state statutes. 
To this end, and in the spirit of cooperation recognized in Fednav, 
Congress could repurpose and expand the Aquatic Nuisance Species 
Task Force (Task Force).  Originally established under NISA, the Task 
                                            
 117. Id. at 876-77.  
 118. Id. at 877-89. 
 119. The Coast Guard was part of the Department of Transportation until February 25, 
2003, when it was moved to the Department of Homeland Security.  Fednav, 505 F. 
Supp. 2d at 386 n.5. 
 120. Boothe, supra note 4, at 417 n.82 (citing Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg. 
6183 (Feb. 3, 1999)). 
 121. Boothe, supra note 4, at 417. 
 122. Id.  
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Force was created to develop the USCG’s ballast water treatment 
program in the Great Lakes region, and ensure that both state and federal 
goals were met.123  The Task Force represented an attempt to bring all 
interested parties to the table,124 and was directed to seek input from both 
state and local lawmakers.125  Specifically,  
[w]henever the Task Force determines that there is a substantial 
risk of unintentional introduction of an aquatic nuisance species 
by an identified pathway and that the adverse consequences of 
such an introduction are likely to be substantial, the Task Force 
shall, acting through the appropriate Federal agency, and after an 
opportunity for public comment, carry out cooperative, 
environmentally sound efforts with regional, State and local 
entities to minimize the risk of such an introduction.126   
The Task Force could easily be expanded to oversee implementation 
and harmonization of all federal and state regulations, both present and 
pending, including any CWA-based regulations that will inevitably result 
from the Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a) in 
Northwest Environmental Advocates.   
For example, both the Senate and House are considering bills—the 
Great Lakes Collaboration Implementation Act of 2009127 and Great 
Lakes Collaboration Implementation Act128 respectively—either of which 
could be altered to specifically account for such an expansion of the Task 
Force.  Both propose continuation of the NISC,129 and could provide 
                                            
 123. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 386.  See also 16 U.S.C. § 4721 (1996) (establishing 
the task force). 
 124. Id. at 386 n.6 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 4721(f) (requiring “[e]ach task force member” to 
coordinate ANS prevention planning with “other members of the Task Force, and 
regional, State and local entities.” (emphasis added)). 
 125. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94. 
 126. 16 U.S.C. §4722(c)(2) (1996). 
 127. S. 237, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (referred to the Committee on Environment 
and Public Works). 
 128. H.R. 500, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (referred to the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committees on Natural 
Resources, Science and Technology, and House Administration.) 
 129. S. 237, 111th Cong. §183 (2009) (proposing the NISC have oversight, by way of 
membership, of Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department of 
Commerce, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of Defense, 
Department of Transportation, Department of Health and Human Services, with 
executive council membership for the each such Secretary); H.R. 500, 111th Cong. §163 
(2009) (proposing the same oversight as the Senate bill, but including the Environmental 
Protection Agency and U.S. Agency for International Development on the council, and 
within NISC oversight).  The House Bill seems most likely to bring into the fold 
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funding necessary not only to sustain the Task Force, but also give it 
teeth, so to speak.130  Combining this inter-agency, interstate Task Force 
with a meaningful penalty structure for violators131 would achieve not 
only the dual aims of safeguarding environmental and economic interests 
tied to a states environment, but could help offset the costs of 
maintaining enforcement.  Presently, the House Bill remains tabled with 
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Committees 
on Natural Resources, Science and Technology, and House 
Administration, while the Senate Bill remains tabled for consideration by 
the Committee on Environment and Public Works.132  While such a 
lengthy delay—coupled with the myriad other issues currently faced by 
Congress—likely mean both bills may well remain on the back burner 
for months to come, the bills nonetheless exhibit a willingness by at least 
a few members of both legislative bodies to push the issue forward.  
Future proposals would do well to take into consideration not only 
funding plans and cooperative schemes proposed by the current 
legislation, but also the congressional intent extrapolated by the court in 
Fednav.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Like the environmental impetus behind the CWA, NANPCA, NISA, 
and MBWS, any future action will be driven by the clear need to prevent 
further spread of ANS via poor ballast water management systems.  
There is too much at stake for all parties involved, whether federal- or 
state-based.  Ballast-born ANS continue to wreak havoc on the 
environment and economy alike.  Current estimates put the yearly 
                                                                                                  
decisions by the EPA under the CWA, as a result of Nw. Envtl. Assoc. Furthermore, the 
House version of the bill proposes the creation of an Invasive Species Advisory 
Committee, which would specifically “recommend to the Council plans and actions at 
local, tribal, State, regional, and ecosystem-based levels to achieve the goals” of the 
NISC.  Id. at § 166(a)-(c) (2009).  
 130. S. 237, 111th Cong. §§189, 201 (2009) (proposing initial expenditures of between 
$2 and $75 million, with the NISC to produce a budget by 2010); H.R. 500, 111th Cong. 
§§ 167, 201 (2009) (proposing initial technical expenditures of up to $75 million on 
implementing coastal programs, with the NISC to produce a more detailed budget for 
2010).  
 131. But not fees for permitting, as it would not be in the States’ interest to increase the 
likelihood that such permitting fees, as exist under the MBWS, could become more than 
de minimis.  
 132. H.R. 500, 111th Cong. preamble (2009); S. 237, 111th Cong. preamble (2009).  
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economic damage to the Great Lakes alone at $500 million.133  Beyond 
the zebra mussel, cholera-causing bacteria—which killed 10,000 people 
in one Peruvian outbreak134—are easily transported by ballast water.  
Similar bacteria cause red tide blooms responsible for up to 100,000 
cases of poisoning annually, atop costing the New England shellfish 
industries an estimated $3 million a week during prolonged blooms.135   
Ultimately, no definitive solution to ballast-born ANS exists.  
Nonetheless, Fednav must be construed as clear judicial guidance that 
federal and state lawmakers must cooperatively regulate the growing 
ANS threat by implementing comprehensive, coterminous ballast water 
regulations. 
 
                                            
 133. Great Lakes Collaboration Implementation Act of 2009, S. 237, 111th Cong. 
§2(5)(C) (2009).  
 134. Christopher J. Patrick, Note, Ballast Water Law: Invasive Species and Twenty-
Five Years of Ineffective Legislation, 27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 67, 72 (2009). 
 135. Id. at 73. 
